Abstract. We are interested in the validation of a cognitive theory of human communication, grounded in a speech acts perspective. The theory we refer to is outlined, and a number of predictions are drawn from it. We report a series of protocols administered to 13 brain-injured subjects and to a comparable control group. The tasks included direct and indirect speech acts, irony, deceits, failures of communication, and theory of mind inferences. All the predicted trends of difficulty are consistently verified; in particular, difficulty increases from direct/indirect speech acts to irony, from irony to deceits, and from deceits to failure recovery. This trend symmetrically shows both in the successful situation and in the failure situation. Further, failure situations prove more difficult to handle than the relevant successful situation. In sharp contrast with previous literature, there is no difference between the subjects' comprehension of direct and indirect speech acts. The results are discussed in the light of our theoretical approach.
Introduction
Pragmatics of communication is the study of the competence involved in intentional communication, independently of the means used to communicate. Theories of communicative competence are usually expressed in terms of the mental states involved in communication. The problem with theories of competence is that they are often underdetermined: it is not sufficient to develop a sound logical analysis, since the relevant behavior might, at least in principle, be produced by a number of different systems. In order to constrain theories of competence, the actual human performance must be taken into account.
The theory of human communication we adopt here lies on the competence level. Current theories of human action and communication are often specified in terms of the mental states involved in the task (belief, intention, and so forth) and of the cognitive dynamics leading from a mental state to another. A state-of-the-art sample of this perspective may be found in the volume edited by Cohen, Morgan & Pollack (1990) ; our own approach will be outlined in the next section.
Mental states are analyzed in terms of the functional role they have in cognition. Belief, for example, is used to encode an agent's current knowledge of the world; intention is used to encode the agent's behavioral decisions, and so on. To take a naive example, one might theorize that Ann's belief that Bob has a candy, together with her desire to eat it, causes (by default) her intention to ask Bob for the candy. As a first approximation, let a more abstract version of the same idea be written like this: BEL x has (y, p) WANT x has (x, p) INT x DO x ask (y, p) This formula comprises three terms and two relations. The first term, BEL x has (y, p), expresses agent x's belief that agent y has possession over object p. The second term, WANT x has (x, p), expresses x's desire to have p. The third term, INT x DO x ask (y, p), expresses x's intention to ask agent y for p.
As regards the two relations, corresponds to the logical connective AND and needs no further explanation in this context. The arrow indicates a default derivation, i.e., one that can be blocked whenever inappropriate to the context (Reiter 1980) . The classic example of default reasoning involves birds: we know that most birds can fly, so when we are told of a certain animal x that it is a bird, we can reasonably assume that it can fly. But, if we then come to know that x is a penguin (or that x is an ostrich, or has a broken wing, and so on), we will have to retreat (block) our previous conclusion. Thus, the assertion that bird (x) flies (x) (i.e., if x is a bird, then x flies) is better written as the default assertion that:
bird (x) flies (x) (i.e., if x is a bird, then x flies unless there is further information that x cannot fly).
We use a default formalization because a complete formal description of all of an individual's mental states is, in principle, impossible. In the candy example, Ann, although having both the belief that Bob has a sweet and the desire to eat it, might decide to say nothing, e.g., because she thinks that Bob is too selfish to give her the candy. Thus, knowing that an agent has a certain mental state can never guarantee the agent's action. It is impossible, in other words, to give a complete account of all the conditions necessary and sufficient for action (this problem is known in artificial intelligence under the name of qualification problem: McCarthy 1980; see also Airenti & Colombetti 1991) .
On the competence level, the system is described as an abstract machine capable of producing a certain behavior. However, there is something more than this to the study of cognition. Although, in principle, any behavior may be produced by an indefinite number of different systems, only one of these is of interest to the human sciences, namely, the one corresponding to the human mind/brain. Theories of human competence, therefore, need be further constrained.
As a first thing, the validation of such theories depends on the adherence of the competence they describe to the characteristics exhibited by the real organism, i.e., on its capability to generate the relevant behavior. This corresponds to what Chomsky (1965) calls the performance of the system; what counts as a system's performance depends on the task considered and on the theory being developed. To study performance impairments after brain damage may help constrain the underlying competence theory.
Theories of communication, as we have discussed above, are usually cast in terms of the relevant mental states and of their dynamics, supposed to realize the process under analysis.
Mental states are not localized, i.e., there seems to be no specific cerebral area where they reside. They can reasonably be supposed to result from the activity of large areas of the brain, each making its own contribution to the overall state of an individual's mind. When such areas are devoted to specific functions, local neural damages may produce specific impairments in the mental states an individual may entertain, or in their content, or in their dynamics.
A damage to the frontal cortex, for example, may imply problems with the individual's planning capabilities, i.e., in terms of a mental-state theory of action (e.g., Tirassa 1997) , with the complex dynamics of beliefs, long-term intentions, short-term intentions etc., involved in behavior planning. A different example comes from autism. This disorder is associated with the lack of a specific, dissociable ability to understand and reason upon the other individuals' mental states as different from those of one's own (U. Frith, Morton & Leslie 1991; Leslie & Thaiss 1992) . Such ability requires specific types of mental states, other than "simple" belief (Leslie 1994 ; see also next section). Autism then consists (at least) in the impossibility to form certain types of mental states, namely, those involved in the attribution of mental states to other individuals (Baron-Cohen 1995) .
The general approach we have adopted is to take a competence theory of human intentional communication, cast in terms of the mental states involved, and to understand how impairments in cognitive skills might possibly yield an impairment in this task. In other words: given a theory of competence, we are trying to constrain it on the basis of data from impaired performance of neuropsychological interest.
We have taken as a starting point the computational theory of communication developed by Airenti, Bara & Colombetti (1993a , 1993b . We have derived from it a number of predictions of the performance of normal and brain-damaged individuals. Finally, we have tested some of these predictions through a series of experiments.
A computational theory of speech acts
Studies of the pragmatics of communication are far from a stable theoretical systematization. Stephen Levinson's Pragmatics (1983) , a standard text of reference for the area, lists as many as 53 pages of different definitions of the term itself. Thus, neither our theoretically driven strategy, nor the details of the theory we adopt, are unanimously agreed upon.
Cognitive pragmatics
Speech act theory (Bara 1995; Leech 1983; Levinson 1983 ) is the most influential school in pragmatics, and appears particularly well-suited for neuropsychology. Further, it has now reached a satisfactory degree of formalization after Austin's (1962) and Searle's (1969) pioneering works, thanks to many works grounded in analytic philosophy and logic (e.g., Grice 1989; Searle & Vanderveken 1985; Sperber & Wilson 1986; Strawson 1964 ), computational linguistics (e.g., Appelt 1985 Cohen, Morgan & Pollack eds. 1990) , and artificial intelligence (e.g., Airenti, Bara & Colombetti 1983; Cohen & Levesque 1991; Cohen & Perrault 1979) .
Within this framework, Airenti, Bara & Colombetti (1993a , 1993b have presented the bases of a computational theory of the cognitive processes underlying human communication. We give here a sketch of their theory, with no discussion of the formal apparatus or of the psychological evidence. We refer the interested reader to the articles cited in the bibliography; to discuss these aspects of our model here would make this paper longer than it already is, and would be likely to diminish its appeal to a readership which is mostly composed of neuroscientists.
Given the assumption that the same analysis holds for both verbal and nonverbal communication, we adopt the terms actor and partner instead of the more traditional speaker and hearer. Further, we follow the convention that actor x is always a female (hence an actress) and partner y is always a male.
A major assumption of Airenti, Bara & Colombetti's (1984) work is that a cognitive analysis of dialogue should distinguish between its conversation and behavior aspects. When one communicates, her aim is to achieve a certain effect on a partner, namely, to change his mental states and possibly to induce him to perform some action. But there is something more. The choice of a communicative way to attain this goal provides her with the subsidiary goal to follow the rules of conversation. Behavior and conversation goals have completely independent origins; thus, an agent's behavior may be noncooperative, in spite of his will to maintain a correct conversation:
[1] Ann: Could you please lend me your car for the weekend?
Bob: Sorry, I promised the kids to go camping with them in the lakes region. Ann: Well, I'll ask Charles. Have a nice trip.
Each level requires a form of cooperation. Behavior cooperation requires that the agents act on the grounds of a plan at least partially shared, which we call behavior game of x and y. For our purposes, action plans can be represented as trees of intentions, whose leaves are specified either as terminal, precisely defined actions, or as higher-level intentions to be worked out according to the context (Pollack 1990 ). Besides, a behavior game specifies the typical situation in which it can be played.
The actions prescribed by a behavior game need not be logically necessary. Some of them may constitute a conventional, habitual part of the interaction, as is the case of the actions of greeting typically prescribed by the games governing meetings between persons. Greetings play no necessary role with respect to the rest of the interaction; nonetheless, it is considered impolite to neglect them.
The actual actions performed by the agents realize the moves of the behavior game they are playing. The meaning of a communicative action (either verbal or nonverbal or, more often, a mix of the two) is fully understood only when it is clear what move of what behavior game it realizes. Thus, we will consider speech acts as moves of behavior games; conversely, each move of a behavior game has a meaning value, and can therefore be considered as a communicative act.
Conversation cooperation is governed by a set of specific rules that, by analogy with behavior games, we call the conversation game. However, the conversation game need not be a shared representation of a multiagent plan, like behavior games; rather, it can be modeled as a set of tasks that each agent has to fulfill in a given sequence. Each task defines a specific phase of the comprehension/generation process. For example, the phase of understanding the speaker's meaning will be characterized by the task of recognizing the behavior game proposed by the actor (see below). Further, the conversation game specifies the chaining of the phases in both standard and nonstandard cases.
Communicative competence can thus be seen as an inferential metalevel, controlling baselevel inferences which are carried out on shared representations of stereotyped patterns of interactions. To clarify this point, let us consider again example [1] . In any standard context, Bob's response would be taken as a justified rejection of Ann's request. The whole exchange can be explained by saying that:
By her request, Ann proposes to Bob to play the behavior game:
• x gives object1 to y;
• y returns object1 to x. By his response, Bob rejects Ann's proposal, on the justification that he himself needs the object requested.
Conversation cooperation requires that Ann and Bob share the knowledge of the behavior game in [2] . The example is deliberately oversimplified: the actual game shared by Ann and Bob must describe the applicability conditions of the request (e.g., you will not ask someone to lend you his car unless he is a close friend of yours) as well as its possible outcomes (e.g., it has to be understood that y may legitimately refuse to comply with x's request). It may also dictate actions necessary on a social, rather than logical, basis (e.g., the use of politeness formulas such as please, thank you and so on). It is the sharedness of these knowledge structures that allows Ann and Bob to maintain conversation cooperation in spite of Bob's refusal to cooperate on the behavior level.
The reason for introducing games is that literal meaning is but the starting point for the full comprehension of an utterance. Why is she saying this to me? and What does she want from me? are the real questions to be answered. Suppose a colleague of yours says:
[3] I'd appreciate a cup of coffee.
while you are working together in her office. Her utterance may be interpreted as a request of a pause, with reference to a sort of [WORK-TOGETHER] behavior game. The same statement, uttered in your house after dinner, might be recognized as a typical move of a [DINNER- TO-GETHER] behavior game: a guest announces a desire that the host is bound to accomplish. Finally, the same utterance would be puzzling, if someone you've never seen before suddenly pops in your office to produce it: either you are able to find a behavior game related to it (i.e., to understand what the actor wants you to think or do), or it will remain unexplained. The point is that in the latter case the context allows you to identify no game, mutually known to you and to the actor, which the utterance may be connected to.
Behavior games thus have a fundamental role in communication: an utterance may be assigned a full meaning only in the context provided for by a behavior game. The recognition of the behavior game bid by the actor does not bind the partner to play his role in the game. On the contrary, the partner can decide to accept or reject the proposed game, or to try to negotiate a different one, or even to let the conversation game interrupt.
As we have said, a behavior game can only be played when the agents share knowledge of it. The concept of sharedness requires some explanation. Airenti, Bara and Colombetti (1993a) argue that communication requires, besides the standard apparatus of private beliefs and intentions, two specific mental states, namely, shared beliefs and communicative intentions. Although different versions of these two concepts can be found in the literature, we will define them here, since they are introduced in an original form.
The concept of shared belief, or mutual knowledge, was introduced by Lewis (1969) and Schiffer (1972) ; many versions thereof have been subsequently developed. We adopt a subjective view of shared belief, i.e., we assume that for an actor to have a shared belief means to have a certain belief and the belief that such belief is shared with one or more specific partners, or with a group of people, or with all human beings. In our model, all the inferences drawn during the understanding of an utterance are drawn in the space of shared beliefs of x and y. Thus, sharedness is crucial in communication; indeed, it is a necessary condition of communication that each agent maintains a shared belief space (Clark 1992) .
We take shared belief to be a primitive, i.e., a specific mental state not reducible to a conjunction of standard private beliefs. This implies rejecting the prevailing view that shared belief is the result of an infinite nesting of beliefs (what x believes, what y believes that x believes, what x believes that y believes that x believes, and so on): human easiness in dealing with shared information rules out any such formula as cognitively implausible (Clark & Marshall 1981) . Rather, the connection between belief and shared belief is captured by a circular axiom, as informally suggested by Harman (1977) :
where SH xy p means that agents x and y share the belief that p. The formula reads as follows: from agent x's viewpoint, agents x and y share the belief that p iff: (i) it is the case that p, and (ii) y and x share the belief that p. A formal model of shared belief has been given by Colombetti (1993) . It is worth emphasizing that shared belief is a mental state held by an individual. It may happen, in other words, that x believes p to be shared by x and y, whereas y does not believe p to be shared by y and x. This, as will be discussed later, may give rise to failures (e.g., misunderstandings) and other nonstandard interpretation paths.
The above axiom is circular in the sense that, by distributing BEL x on the conjunction, it is logically possible to derive an infinite number of nested implications of the type: SH xy p BEL x p SH xy p BEL x BEL y p SH xy p BEL x BEL y BEL x p SH xy p … i.e., if x and y share that p, then x believes p, x believes that y believes p, x believes that y believes that x believes that p, and so on. However, in no case can a resource-bounded cognitive system derive more than a limited number of these implications. Finite nesting of beliefs play an important role in nonstandard communicative situations, particularly in the case of deceits, where some of these formulae can be negated, without affecting the derivation of the others.
The second mental state we postulate as a primitive is communicative intention. Successful communication has been described by Grice (1957) as the recognition of a particular set of mental states, among which are the intention to achieve a certain effect on the partner, and the intention that such intention be recognized. Such conditions have been strengthened by Strawson (1964) and Schiffer (1972) . Airenti, Bara & Colombetti (1993a) show that any definition including a finite number of nested intentions is too weak, because it will leave unrecognized part of the interactive situation, and therefore will not capture appropriately the notion of communication. On the other hand, for the reasons discussed above, no living system can be supposed to draw infinite chains of inferences.
This problem can be solved by defining the intention to communicate as comprising two components: the intention to share some fact, and the intention to share the whole intention to communicate. More precisely, x has the communicative intention that p with respect to y, i.e., x intends to communicate p to y (in symbols, CINT xy p), when x intends that the two following facts be shared by y and x: that p, and that x intends to communicate p to y:
From this formula an infinite number of logical implications may be derived of the type:
., x intends to share that p, x intends to share that x intends to share that p, and so on).
The model of dialogue
We report here the basic model of dialogue developed by Airenti, Bara & Colombetti (1993a) . The general scheme of the comprehension/generation cycle goes as follows: actor x's utterance is received by partner y, who represents its meaning; y's mental states about the domain of discourse may be affected by the comprehension; then y plans his next dialogue move, which is eventually generated. We distinguish five logically chained phases, described below, in y's mental processes. The chaining of these five processes is controlled by the conversation game (see Figure 1) .
Understanding literal meaning.
The starting point of this phase is the result of y's analysis of x's utterance as a literal illocutionary act, with addressee y, propositional content p, and literal illocutionary force f. The task set up by the conversation game for this phase is to recognize the actor's expression act. Once the expression act is recognized, the conversation game activates the process of understanding the speaker's meaning. Understanding speaker's meaning. Here y comprehends x's communicative intentions. All the relevant inferences are drawn in the space of shared beliefs. The starting point is the literal meaning recognized, and the result is the recognition of the actor's communicative intentions. The task of this phase is to reach a state in which it is shared by x and y that x has communicated her intention to play a certain move of a certain behavior game with y.
Communicative effect. We define as the communicative effect on y the set of all of y's mental states, acquired or modified in accordance with x's communicative intentions. A further condition is that such mental states are actually caused by the corresponding communicative intention; for instance, the fact that someone is trying to make us believe that it is raining must be the reason (or part of the reason) for believing that it is raining. Differently from the previous ones, this phase does not consist in a recognition; further, it involves private beliefs and motivations (Airenti, Bara & Colombetti 1989 ). E.g., to understand that somebody is requesting us to lend her the car is a matter of shared knowledge on the use of language; but to decide whether to comply is definitely different, and involves private motivations. Thus, the conversation game leads y to question whether he should adhere to x's communicative intentions; in particular, y has to decide whether to play the game proposed by x (adjustment); this may also require that private mental states of x's be hypothesized by y (attribution: e.g., Bob might wonder what use Ann intends to make of his car).
Reaction.
Here the intentions for the generation of a response are produced, which will be the input to the subsequent, final phase. From a conversation point of view, the response has to include information to x about the effects achieved by her speech act. Thus, the communicative intentions produced in the reaction phase result from the integration of the communicative effect (i.e., the output of the adjustment process) with the behavior game that y desires to play with x. The conversation metalevel dictates that the reaction be pertinent to the analysis performed in understanding the speaker's meaning. Thus, y has to take a stance about x's communicative intentions, whether or not they have succeeded. The task of this phase is to plan the achievement of a communicative effect on x.
Response generation.
Here an overt response is generated, which will be used by x as a feedback on the results of her communicative attempt.
Experimental setting

Rationale for the experiments
We are interested in neuropsychological correlates of pragmatic theories of communication. Our aim is not to build a theory of normal communication, starting from a collection of data from impaired performance. We already have such theory, developed on independent grounds, and are trying to falsify it, or at least to test it against competing ones, by an exploration of possible impairments in the communicative skills of brain damaged individuals. A welcome side effect of this research might be to help build a framework for the comprehension of some consequences of brain damage. Among the many potential neuropsychological implications of pragmatics, we have decided to start from the investigation of some relatively simple inferences involved in communication, with a certain emphasis on comprehension rather than generation. Our subjects were individuals who suffered from the consequences of a closed head injury (CHI). This pathology is known to imply a constellation of symptoms. Primary linguistic processes are usually preserved (although with possible exceptions, such as specific anomia: Semenza & Zettin 1988 . Communicative skills, however, are often impaired (e.g., Joanette, Goulet, Ska & Nespoulous 1986; McDonald 1992; McDonald & van Sommers 1993; Sherratt & Penn 1990 ). These individuals' discourse is often confused and disorganized, with frequent intrusion of inappropriate associations, stereotypical perseverations, insinuations, or indirect contextual references. However, such subtle symptoms are not easily defined in the absence of a sound theory of normal communication (Joanette & Brownell eds. 1990) .
CHI symptoms are typically related to diffused tissular sufferance, or axonal damage. Thus, they can be hypothesized to result from the impairment of many different subsystems. This fits our current interests quite well: we do not aim here at associating specific deficits with specific foci, but at exploring how communication, a highly sophisticated process guaranteed to involve a number of different skills and subsystems, may be affected by brain injury.
As regards the methods suitable for investigations in this area, we wanted our protocols to leave the subjects' performance as unconstrained as possible. Communication is a peculiar activity, which seldom, if ever, prescribes anything like a "correct answer": most of the times, the ultimate meaning of an utterance is a matter of negotiation between the actor and the partner (Recanati 1995; Tirassa 1997) . Also, open judgments tasks are strongly suggested in the study of CHI for neuropsychological reasons: as Shallice & Burgess (1991) point out, standard neuropsychological tests are unlikely to be useful in this syndrome, because they tend to provide for exactly the kind of structure the subject lacks.
We chose relatively simple and well-defined tasks because we wanted the results to be as clear as possible. Because the coordinates of the ground we are moving on are largely unknown, it is necessary to start with an assessment of some very basic capabilities before considering more complex aspects of the theory. Our first concern was therefore to understand to what extent the fundamentals of communicative ability were impaired or disrupted.
Thus, the tasks had to be both simple and unconstrained. Most of our protocols consisted in some variation on a standard design, which we will briefly describe in the next subsection. The variations, as well as the few protocols which were truly different, will be described in the relevant sections below. Our experiments explored different aspects of the theory, namely:
• the standard comprehension path and the problem of direct vs. indirect speech acts; • two nonstandard paths, namely, irony and deceits; • for each of the categories above, failures and their recovery;
• the ability to make inferences about another individual's mental states; these so-called theory of mind inferences, although not communicative per se, play nonetheless a major role in the generation and comprehension of communication.
Most of our tasks were designed to explore inferences in comprehension, because most theories of pragmatics have been developed basically from an understander's point of view, and ours is no exception; most relevant work in neuropsychology has focused on understanding as well. A subset of protocols, however, dealt with some aspects of generation; in particular, with deceits and with failure recovery.
Method
The standard protocol is as follows. The subject is shown short (10-25 sec) scenes on a videotape recorder. Each scene involves two characters in an everyday context, such as a typical living room; a brief and simple dialogue occurs between them about some simple topic or event. A sample dialogue is the following (taken from the protocols about indirect speech acts, see Section 5 below):
[4] Child: Can I ride my bike, Mom?.
Mother: It has a broken wheel. 1
Needless to say, the actual sessions took place in Italian: here, we are translating everything into English. For the sake of convenience, further, we will conventionally use the feminine form for the experimenters and the masculine form for the experimental subjects. Actually, sexes were equally distributed in each category. Immediately after each scene, the subject is asked to report his understanding of it, or what he thinks might happen immediately after the episode portrayed. In [4], the experimenter asks: "What did Mom mean by that?". The goal is to understand whether the subject has correctly analyzed the two utterances; in particular, whether he has taken the mother's answer as implying that the bicycle cannot be used. In order to pass the task, thus, the subject can respond anything like "That the child cannot go out", or "That she wants him to stay at home", or "That he'll have to repair it", and so on.
In order to avoid the superimposition of possible short-term memory impairments, the subject can review the scene whenever he wants, with no limitation on the number of repetitions. The subject is left free to interpret the episode in whatever way he likes, without any intervention on the part of the experimenter and without any time constraint, until he says he has no more remarks to make. Then, he is shown the next scene.
The experimenter takes note of all the answers given by the subject, in their respective order. Further, the whole session is tape-recorded. The tape is later reheard by two independent judges, in order to be certain of the subject's interpretation and to avoid possible biases on the part of the experimenters. The judges were two speech therapists; they were well acquainted with CHI in general and with the specific subjects in particular, but blind with respect to both the theoretical approach and the goal of the research.
In the case of an unclear answer (i.e., one from which the subject's comprehension cannot be classified as correct or incorrect) the experimenter poses a direct, closed question, asking the subject to choose among three different proposed interpretations of the scene: one is the "correct" interpretation, i.e., the one most people would reasonably give; one is just literal, but plausible anyway, and one makes no sense in the current context. The order of presentation of these options is randomized. E.g., in [4]: "inferential": Mom means that the child cannot go out; "literal": Mom means that the wheel is broken; "out of context": Mom means that Dad is coming home.
However, we needed to resort to these subprotocols only in four cases (two complex indirect speech acts and two ironies, see below), which makes this point substantially irrelevant.
There were 21 tasks. Their order of presentation was randomized for each subject. The average time for the whole protocol was approximately 30 minutes.
Subjects
The protocols were administered individually to 13 patients, 6 females and 7 males, with severe CHI of traumatic origin, who had been admitted to the hospital for post-acute neuropsychological, motor, and speech rehabilitation. None of them had a previous history of neurological or psychiatric disturbance. The demographic and clinical characteristics of the subjects are reported in Table 1 . The control group consisted of the same number of individuals, of comparable sex, age and education, and having no history of neurological or psychiatric disease, or of alcohol or drug abuse.
The subjects were tested on a number of language and cognitive skills; the results are presented in Table 2 and briefly discussed in Section 9. We will only notice here that, although some subjects presented an impairment in metalinguistic skills, and sometimes anomia as well, none of them had any symptom of aphasia.
Aphasia impairs communication at a relatively low level, through a damage to the linguistic execution of decisions taken at the communication (i.e., pragmatic) level. High-level communicative competence, on the contrary, is often reasonably spared (Feyereisen & Seron 1982; Foldi, Cicone & Gardner 1983; Guilford & O'Connor 1982; Holland 1982; Joanette & Brownell eds. 1990; Penn 1987; Penn & Cleary 1988) . These results have led to therapeutic approaches aimed at the enhancement of alternative communicative channels (e.g., Davis & Wilcox 1981 , 1985 Howard & Hatfield 1987) , in addition to the more classical attempts rehabilitation of strictly linguistic functions.
These results are in perfect agreement with our theoretical approach. We consider communication as a high-level competence, whose behavioral expression is realized through an understandable combination of any possible means of expression. Language, gestures, drawings, and so on, all may be used for communicative purposes. How a person communicates will be affected by an impairment of one of these media and particularly of such a preeminent one as language; but only insofar as the damage impedes the externalization of the individual's mental states. Communication and language can and should be kept independent of each other, as is also maintained by Chomskyan linguistics (Chomsky 1980) and by many studies in animal cognition (e.g., Burling 1993; Premack 1986 ).
The standard path: direct vs. indirect speech acts
Let us now turn to a more detailed analysis of the experiments. To repeat, we explored the following issues: Table 2b . Neuropsychological data (2nd part).
• direct vs. indirect speech acts, and relevant failures (this section);
• two different nonstandard paths, namely, irony and deceits, and relevant failures (Sections 6 and 7);
• theory of mind inferences (Section 8).
We will present each topic separately, illustrating its relevance, its role within our theoretical approach, the experiments with the relevant predictions, and the results. A general discussion will follow in Section 9. This section deals with the standard comprehension path: given an actor's utterance, the partner's task is to understand its relation to the behavior game in play, or to a newly proposed one. Irony and deceits are two different nonstandard paths: in both cases, there is something more to the utterance than would seem at a superficial glance. We also explored the subjects' performance on the failures of each of these three comprehension paths, in order to assess possible differences with the performance on the relevant cases of success. Theory of mind inferences are somehow different: the ability to reason upon other individuals' mental states is ancillary to communication rather than communicative per se. We decided to explore it because of its heavy involvement in dialogue; further, as far as we know, it had never been tested in these neuropsychological pathologies.
Our adopted theory allowed us to make qualitative predictions. We expected, e.g., that some types of utterances would turn out to be easier to understand than other ones, or harder, and so on. A competence theory clearly does not allow to formulate predictions of a quantitative nature.
To understand communication is to infer an actor's meaning, starting from the observation and analysis of whatever behavior of hers can be considered communicative (what we call literal meaning). Most theories of pragmatics, and all the few relevant neuropsychological investigations, adopt a Searlean view of speech acts understanding. Searle (1975) draws a distinction between direct and indirect speech acts. A direct speech act is performed when the literal meaning of an utterance corresponds straightforwardly to its intended one (in our terms, to the speaker's meaning). E.g., given the intention to induce the partner to close the window, the corresponding direct speech act would be the uttering of an imperative sentence:
[5] Close the window.
A speech act is indirect when the literal meaning and the speaker's meaning of an utterance do not correspond. Thus, any of an indefinite number of sentences may be used as an indirect request to close the window:
[6] a. Searle (1975) also outlines the inferential path supposed to allow for the recovery of the indirect meaning; give a computational reformulation thereof. The machinery needed to recognize the contextual inadequacy of the literal interpretation can be provided for by, e.g., the maxims of conversation that Grice (1975) derived from his cooperative principle.
A similar explanation supposedly holds for other kinds of nonliteral interpretation as well (e.g., conversational implicatures, irony, etc.). The basic algorithm remains the same: recover the literal illocution and, if this is contextually inappropriate, look for an acceptable alternative.
This model, however, poses a number of problems. First, it depends completely on a straightforward identification of communication with language: how to distinguish direct and indirect ways to gesticulate? E.g., is a "meaningful" gaze, accompanied by a slight movement of the head and a raising of the eyebrow, more direct or indirect than a window-oriented waving of the hand with a grumble? Even within the boundaries of a linguistic analysis, anyway, it is not at all clear how to arrange all literal illocutions with the three sentential moods allowed by many languages, Italian and English included (affirmative, interrogative and imperative), or how to handle elliptical sentences ("The window, my God!"). The basic algorithm has also been criticized for its cognitive implausibility (Clark 1979) . The underlying assumption that the illocutionary level has an ontological status of its own may be questioned as well (e.g., Cohen & Levesque 1985 Sperber & Wilson 1986) .
Our position, as should be apparent after Section 3, is that there exists no illocutionary level as such; and, consequently, that there can exist nothing like an indirect speech act -or a direct one. Every instance of dialogue understanding involves inferential activity: in no way can an utterance be understood with no inferences taking place at all (see Gazdar 1981 and Levinson 1983 for further arguments in favor of inferential theories of pragmatics). According to our own theory, an agent's observed behavior is understood as communicative when its role in a behavior game has been inferred, and that's all. Whether such behavior is a linguistic utterance (and, if so, whether it is affirmative, interrogative, imperative, elliptical, etc.), or a gesture, or a drawing, is irrelevant; and whether it is more or less straightforward is not a matter of directness or indirectness of the illocution, but of the difficulty of the inferential chain needed to recognize the game proposed.
To reject the difference between direct and indirect speech acts, indeed, does not imply that all utterances are equally easy to understand. The choice among the various utterances in [5]-[6a-h] may make a big difference: some of them are quite easy to understand in everyday contexts; others less; and some may be really hard. Analogously, we all have a rich experience of conversations where every single word has an unclear meaning; political as well as academic debates may be a very slippery ground, but not for reasons of "indirectness" as defined by Searle. There are a few neuropsychological works on indirect speech acts (in particular, on pseudoidiomatic indirect requests, such as those in [6a-b]): e.g., Foldi (1987) , Heeschen & Reischies (1979) , Hirst, LeDoux & Stein (1984) , McDonald (1992) , McDonald & van Sommers (1993) , Weylman, Brownell, Roman & Gardner (1989) , and Wilcox, Albyn & Leonard (1978) . In her review of this literature, however, Stemmer (1994) remarks that the phenomena under investigation are never defined clearly or formally and that, for this reason, no finding, albeit suggestive, has a clear meaning. She also points at some difficulties with Searle's model, such as the notion of "levels of indirectness" (i.e., the fact, discussed above, that not all indirect speech acts are equally difficult to understand).
All these empirical findings seem to prove that indirect speech acts are more difficult to understand than direct ones. These results are in agreement with Searle's approach. Our data, however, are quite different: we found no evidence for a difference between direct and indirect utterances. Our protocols comprised two different series of data related to indirect speech acts.
Observations in the wild
As a first thing, before starting the formal experimental session, there was a short, informal phase during which the experimenter tried to put the subject at ease, "prepared the material" for the experiments, explained what was going to happen, etc. During this informal phase, she nonchalantly addressed the subject with both direct and indirect utterances, some of which were indeed part of the experiment itself: The other experimenter, sitting by the first one and "filling in modules", was actually evaluating the subject's reactions to the different classes of utterances, marking them as adequate or inadequate.
It has to be noticed that, although the "indirect" forms in [8] are seldom, if ever, used literally, they are definitely not idioms (as would be, for example, the expression "to kick the buck" used instead of "to die"). Since their literal interpretation cannot be ruled out in principle, forms like [8] are indeed considered prototypical indirect speech acts, to the point that most of the examples discussed in philosophy of language (Searle 1975) , artificial intelligence ) and neuropsychology (Foldi 1987; Hirst, LeDoux & Stein 1984; Weylman, Brownell, Roman & Gardner 1989; Wilcox, Albyn & Leonard 1978) belong to this class. It also has to be noticed that forms like those in [8] are, as far as it is known, universally diffused in human languages (Brown & Levinson 1987 ; see also Levinson 1983 for further discussion and a rejection of the idiomatic interpretation of indirect speech acts).
Thus, theories accepting the direct/indirect distinction would reasonably predict that the utterances in [8] impose a greater inferential load on the understander than those in [7] . Our prediction, on the contrary, was that no difficulty should be encountered with either class, because of the obviousness of the behavior game proposed.
We want to emphasize the importance of these observations in the wild. Communication is no formal task to human beings; rather, it is a means to engage in, and maintain, social interactions with other individuals who are active planners and understanders in their turn. Thus, an individual's task is definitely not to solve a technical problem about language, but to involve other individuals in the cooperative activity of conversation (e.g., aphasics' communicative performance is known to be reasonably satisfactory in everyday contexts, in spite of their linguistic impairment: de Bleser & Weisman 1986). Protocols [7] and [8] aimed at exploring spontaneous (understanding of) communication in informal contexts. A similar procedure might have been to ask the subjects' relatives to provide for the same kind of evaluation; however, they could not be expected to adequately handle formal definitions of direct vs. indirect speech acts.
Standard experiments
We also made experiments on indirect speech acts during the formal session, with scenes like those described in Section 4. The contexts considered here were relatively more difficult than those in [7] - [8] . Difficulty, as discussed above, depends on the inferential path needed to get to the speaker's meaning from the literal meaning. As is common in linguistics, we rely on a shared background among the experimenter, the subject, and the reader, to guarantee our intuitions about what should be easier or harder for an individual in everyday contexts.
The protocols were as follows:
[9] Child: "Mom, can I ride my bike?". Mother: "It has a broken tire". Comment: this is the example we discussed as [4] above. The task is passed if the subject realizes that Mom will not allow the child to use the bike, or that she is reminding him that he will have to repair it.
[10] Child: "Mom, can I have some chocolate?". Mother: "You have already eaten too much". Comment: the task is passed if the subject understands that the child will be given no more chocolate.
[11] (The characters are looking outside through a window).
Child: "Mom, let's go out and play". Mother: "It's raining". Comment: the task is passed if the subject understands that the characters will not go out, or that they will have to take an umbrella with them, etc.
In each case, there are two indirect speech acts to be interpreted, since both the child's requests and the mother's ever-repressing answers are indirect speech acts according to Searle's definition. This should put a considerable inferential load on the interpretation, and our subjects were expected to encounter more problems with [9]-[11] than with [8].
Failures of indirect speech acts
The third series of protocols on indirect speech acts aimed at exploring the subjects' ability to handle failures. Communication fails whenever it does not achieve the goals it was planned for. Different classes of failures may be distinguished, according to what phase fails (Airenti, Bara & Colombetti 1993b ). The conversation goal to let the partner understand fails when he misunderstands the speaker's meaning, or when he understands no meaning at all. The behavior goals to play one's own role in a game, and to induce the partner to do the same in his turn, fail respectively when the partner refuses to acknowledge the agent's move as a valid one, or when he refuses to do his part.
We used two scenes here regarding, respectively, the failure of a direct and of an indirect speech act:
[12] Direct speech act.
(Child B is taking candies out of a box and eating them). Child A: Give me a candy. Child B: No. The subject is asked what Child A can do to recover from the failure. Strategies for recovery depend on the perceived cause of the failure. To just realize that something has gone wrong is not sufficient: it is also necessary to understand what has gone wrong. E.g., in the case of a request, it may have happened that the partner has not heard it, or has not understood it, or has misunderstood it, or is unwilling to comply with it, etc.
Since a failure may be due to any of an indefinite number of possible causes (which can be seen as a reformulation of the infamous qualification problem and frame problem: McCarthy 1980; McCarthy & Hayes 1968), we let the subjects free to make hypotheses about the situations proposed and the possible ways out. Thus, an appropriate answer could be something like "She can promise something to the other child if he gives her a candy" and so on. The answer "She can ask again" was considered ambiguous, because it does not discriminate between a simple repetition of the failed utterance (which would be appropriate only if the partner is supposed not to have heard the first attempt), and the planning of a different one (such as "Come on, you have so many candies, and I just want to taste one"). In this case, the experimenter asked the subject exactly what sentence he thought Child A would utter.
Consistently with our hypothesis on direct and indirect speech acts, we expected no differences between [12] and [13] . In fact, both cases are simple speech acts. We predicted the relevant inferences to be saved at least in part, because a dramatic loss in the ability to handle failures (both of one's own and of the partner's) would severely hamper social interactions.
However, we expected the subjects to encounter more difficulties with these scenes than with the successful ones, because of the greater attentional and inferential load needed for an appropriate handling of failures. When a failure occurs, the actor has to realize that what the partner thinks is not what the actor wanted him to think. Further, the adoption of a strategy for recovery is a form of planning, and CHI patients often suffer from an impairment in planning skills, specially when the frontal lobes are involved.
A couple of answers sounded like "Child A can beat Child B and take the candies". We decided to consider them inappropriate, because of their inappropriateness in the friendly context presented. The repair of a communication failure cannot involve whatever action may achieve the desired goal, but mandates for a more subtle form of planning.
Results
All our predictions were confirmed, as shown in Tables 3 and 4. The control group solved the tasks without any problem. None of our subjects made a single error in understanding simple speech acts, either direct or indirect. As predicted by our theory, and in sharp contrast with the findings of previous research, all the CHI subjects comprehended all sentences in the wild, without regard to their directness or indirectness. As regards complex indirect speech acts, there were 37 correct answers out of 39 (13 3) items. 2 subjects made one mistake each (5% of the total), which is not statistically significant; further, both were able to pick the "inferential" answer out of the three possibilities presented in the closed judgment task.
These findings are fully consistent with our theoretical approach. They, on the contrary, contradict all previous neuropsychological research and undermine the traditional approach to speech acts in terms of illocutions. If cognitively impaired subjects present no difference in the comprehension of direct and indirect speech acts, then there is no reason to think that the latter impose a greater inferential load than the former, as would be predicted in a Searlean perspective.
The difference between our results and those found in the literature needs be explained. We substantially agree with the points made by Stemmer (1994) in her review: previous research was inadequate from both a theoretical and an experimental viewpoint. The topic of indirect speech acts was not integrated in an overall approach to the pragmatics of communication; the kind of indirect speech acts considered had not been defined satisfactorily, and the strict adherence to Searle's analysis prevented any discussion about the "level of indirectness" of the various utterances (i.e., about their difficulty). This theoretical confusion mirrors in the frequent ambiguity of the protocols used.
Further, previous research invariably used closed judgment tasks, which have two major drawbacks. The first is that they are too rigid to allow a satisfactory exploration of the subject's interpretation of a situation (Stemmer 1994) . The second has been discussed above: closed judgment tasks are generally not recommended in CHI, because a subject's difficulties may be masked if he can exploit the structure of the task instead of imposing his own one on it (Shallice & Burgess 1991) . It must be noticed that, as a consequence, using open judgment tasks should yield a worse, rather than a better, performance in CHI subjects, i.e., the odds were against us. Thus, the contrast between our data and the previous ones is made even sharper.
Finally, the neuropsychological characteristics of the subjects studied in previous research were often ill-defined.
We tried to avoid all these problems. Throughout this work, we make use of a well-defined theoretical approach. We aim at exploring a two-way relationship between pragmatics and neuropsychology. On the one hand, we are looking for a coherent theoretical framework in which to integrate clinical findings about human communication; on the other hand, we hope to find clinical evidence in support of the particular framework we have adopted. Thus, we argue that Stemmer's concerns are undebatable, and that unambiguous clinical results can only emerge through the use of strong theoretical foundations. As regards the particular problem discussed in this section, indirect speech acts, we also argue that Searle's model cannot provide for such foundations.
Our results on the direct/indirect controversy may give rise to an objection, which we need to rule out. The objection is that our tasks might have been too easy for our subjects not to pass them, i.e., that we might have incurred in a ceiling effect. This has been hypothesized both by Marco Colombetti (personal communication) and by one of the referees.
We do not view this point as pertinent. The theoretical difference between direct and indirect speech acts is qualitative, not quantitative. In the direct case, no inference is supposed to take place beyond the recovery of the literal meaning: there simply is nothing more to the speaker's meaning than the literal meaning, so that understanding the latter corresponds straightforwardly to understanding the former. In the indirect case, on the contrary, the path to be followed is rather complex: once the literal meaning has been recovered, its contextual inappropriateness must be recognized, and a different, nonliteral meaning must be looked for (Searle 1975) . Within the range of indirect speech acts, quantitative differences in difficulty are supposed to obviously exist in a continuum, but this has seldom been perceived as particularly interesting (Stemmer 1994) .
In this framework, it seems quite reasonable to look for neuropsychological evidence on the border between the direct and the indirect cases, rather than in some random point along the quantitative continuum of indirect speech acts. Indeed, this is exactly what has been commonly done: the evidence found in previous research mostly concerns the difference between direct speech acts and very simple indirect speech acts, i.e., the predicted qualitative threshold. Of the five main references on this topic, thus, three (namely, Hirst, LeDoux & Stein 1984; Weylman, Brownell, Roman & Gardner 1989; Wilcox, Albyn & Leonard 1978) only tested utterances like "Can you do X?" vs. "Do X"; the level of difficulty is the same of our "simple" protocols. The remaining two studies tested also (Foldi 1987) , or only (Heeschen & Reischies 1979) , more difficult utterances, but not harder than our "complex" protocols.
We explored both the qualitative breakpoint (i.e., the difference between direct and simple indirect speech acts: tasks [7] vs. [8] ) and the quantitative continuum (with some more difficult tasks: [9]-[11]). As regards the former, our tasks were at the standard level of difficulty of previous research; as regards the latter, they were at the level of difficulty of the most difficult tasks used in previous research. We will also remind, once again, that we used open judgment tasks, whereas all the previous research used closed tasks; this means that our tasks were actually more difficult to CHI patients than those previously designed.
A Searlean approach in terms of illocutions would have been validated by a significant difference across the predicted threshold between direct and simple indirect speech acts, i.e., between tasks [7] and [8] . The difference between our results and the previous ones is that we found no difference here. If no experimental breakdown can be found across a theoreticallymotivated, qualitative threshold, then there is no reason to suppose that such threshold really exists. Thus, the point is not that our data here show no difference, but that we were not looking for statistical significance here. Once the standard prediction is disconfirmed, our theory appears more suitable than the competing ones, because it denies the very idea of a qualitative threshold.
As regards the quantitative continuum of indirect speech acts (tasks [8]-[11]), we found no statistically significant difference. Such difference is more likely to be found with more difficult utterances (such as [6g-h] above), but this is irrelevant to the present study. What we are saying is not that CHI subjects have no inferential problems in communication, but that our approach can describe and explain their problems better than the classical illocutionary framework.
Our theory allows for breakdowns in the individual performance at any degree of difficulty, because we deny the existence of qualitative differences: there are always inferences to be drawn in understanding communication. As the difficulty of these inferences increases, breakdowns in the individual performances will become correspondingly more likely, and that's all: there can be no specific breaking points. Where competing theories would predict a specific, theoretically-motivated breaking point, we found nothing at all. While this crucial negative finding has no explanation in standard theories, it has a simple one in ours: the inferential load is too low to pose problems to CHI subjects.
Nonstandard path I: Irony
After recognizing the literal meaning, the partner's task is to understand the speaker's meaning, i.e., to comprehend the actor's communicative intentions. In this phase, the partner may also recognize the actor's attempt to pursue a nonstandard path.
Many nonstandard paths involve some form of exploitation. The term exploitation is borrowed from Grice's (1975) discussion of how his maxims of cooperation can be exploited to convey conversational implicatures. Analogously, the rules of the model proposed by Airenti, Bara & Colombetti (1993b) can be exploited to lead the dialogue toward nonstandard paths. Irony is the most common example of exploitation; others are as-if situations, metaphors, hyperboles, etc.
Here, our discussion will be restrained to the simplest cases of irony, such as:
[14] You have been so kind! uttered to a clerk insolently unwilling to comply with a legitimate request. What makes the utterance ironic is that the agents share that precisely the opposite of its literal meaning holds. This blocks the application of the rule stating that: SH yx DO x express (x, BEL x p) SH yx CINT xy p (i.e., in the shared belief space, if actor x expresses the belief that p, then by default she intends to share p with y).
As shown by this simple example, exploitations are ways to play with sharedness: statement [14], obviously an ironic one in the context described, would be taken seriously if reported to a third person unaware of the specific circumstances. In other words, an ironic intent does not affect how rules are chained in a sequence, but how they are used.
Often (but not necessarily) the ironic intent can be recognized by reversing the meaning expressed. Grice's (1975) definition of irony is limited to such simple cases of reversal. His position, however, has been criticized for two reasons. First, some ironic statements are not understood by this simple rule. Sperber & Wilson (1986) report an excellent quotation from Voltaire's Candide: "When all was over and the rival kings were celebrating their victory with Te Deums in the respective camps...". Further, Grice's account leaves unclear why p should be interpreted as an ironic non-p, and not as a lie (Morgan 1990 ).
Both Sperber & Wilson and Morgan offer alternative interpretations. According to Sperber & Wilson, irony is "echoic", in that it echoes the attitudes and thoughts of somebody else than the speaker herself; according to Morgan, irony is "transparent pretense" on the part of the speaker to believe the bizarre thing she has just said.
Our thesis is that the only way to distinguish an ironic utterance from a serious one is to consider what knowledge the actor takes to be shared with the partner. Actually, if the actor wrongly believes that some crucial piece of knowledge is shared with the partner, irony cannot be recognized. Let us consider the examples we gave to our subjects:
[15] (A child is building a big but questionably balanced Lego structure. A girl enters who inadvertently destroys the construction).
Child: "Thanks for the help!"
[16] (Child A is taking chocolates out of a box and eating them). Child A: "This is the last one" Child B: "Can I have it?" (Child A unwraps the last chocolate, eats it and hands the empty tinfoil to Child B). Child B: "How generous of you!"
[17] (Children A and B are racing in a yard. Child A wins; Child B arrives with a remarkable delay and puffing). Child A: "You run real fast". Child B: "Give me a break!".
In each case, the subject's task is to explain what, in his opinion, the child meant by her utterance. To understand the three scenes he had to realize that the actors share the belief that to destroy a toy building is no helpful behavior, that a kind person should be willing to share what she is eating with other people (particularly after a request thereof) and, respectively, that a faster runner should have won the race. Any answer from which it could be inferred that the subject had understood irony would be considered correct, e.g., "He was joking", or "He was laughing at the other child" etc. Our predictions were of a certain difficulty with these tasks, for the reasons we have mentioned above; in particular, because of the difficulty of handling different, possibly contrasting, representations of the actors' mental states. This characteristic is common to all exploitations: the understander has to keep in mind both the standard path and the nonstandard path in order to compare them and decide what is going on inside the actor's mind. Consequently, we expected the subjects to encounter more difficulties here than with the standard path, at least as far as simple examples are considered in each category.
Failures of irony
Irony, like any other communicative act, may fail. The protocol we used to test our subjects' comprehension of such failures was the following:
[18] (Child A wears a very ugly and dirty T-shirt).
Child B: "Lovely shirt you're wearing today!". Child A (rejoicing): "You can't have it".
The question we asked was "What can Child B do now?". Here, the subject has to understand that the Child B's intention to be ironic failed because Child A did not recognize it and took Child B's statement seriously.
We expected the subjects to encounter more difficulties in handling irony when it fails than when it is successful, for the reasons discussed about the failures of the standard path. Further, we predicted failures of irony to be more difficult than failures of the standard path, for the same reason why successful irony was predicted to be more difficult than the successful standard path. In other words, we predicted the following trends: (i) that nonstandard paths are more difficult than the standard one; (ii) that, within each category, a failure is more difficult than the corresponding successful case; (iii) that, as a consequence of (i) and (ii), failures of nonstandard paths are more difficult than failures of the standard path.
Results
The control group solved all the tasks without any error. The results of the experimental group are reported in Tables 3 and 4 . There were three errors (8% of the answers), two of which were corrected with the closed judgment task. This is only suggestive of a certain difficulty with irony: in fact, the comparison with the control group is near significant (Student's t = 1.897, p < .07). The result seems to confirm that, on the average, CHI patients encounter no real problems with simple everyday communication. Once again, it is an easy guess that they would be less successful in harder situations. It is particularly difficult, however, to make quantitative predictions within this topic, since, as we all know, normal persons themselves may experience some problems with difficult cases of irony.
Nonstandard path II: Deceits
The other type of nonstandard communicative situation we explored concerns the relationship between the mental states communicated by the actor and the private ones she actually entertains, or is supposed to entertain. Airenti, Bara & Colombetti (1993b) define a deceit as a premeditated rupture of the rules governing sincerity in the behavior game in play. For example, the German spy Mata Hari may inform the French general Nivelle that there will be a German attack to Verdun, although she knows that there will be no such attack. Her utterance is a deceit in that the game she is playing with the partner commits her to sincerity about this kind of topic (although not about any kind of topic, of course).
Contrary to what happens with irony, a deceit must pass undetected to be successful. When the partner realizes that the actor is attempting a deceit, he may either denounce it or pretend credulity, while possibly planning a counterdeceit. These situations correspond to distinct mental states of the partner, which can be formally described by different nestings of the SH operator. Figure 2 presents some possibilities. While there is no principled limit to the complexity of the situations (i.e., to the nesting of the SH operator inside a sequence of BEL operators), humans are incapable of handling deceits beyond a small number of levels.
Actually, deceits are among the most complex social phenomena, as is also shown by the difficulty to prove their presence even in nonhuman Primates, however complex their social life may be (Byrne & Whiten eds. 1988; . Deceits require planning and understanding intricate communicative or behavioral strategies, which always include explicit reasoning of the most complex kind about the partner's mental states. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect some difficulty in planning and understanding even simple deceits.
We decided to partially change the protocol design here, because scenes involving deceits would be either too long or too complicated to understand. We used one comprehension task, [19] , and asked the subjects to directly plan and perform two other deceits: [20] and [21] .
[19] Where is the ring? The Princess and the Villain together hide a ring. Both exit. The Villain sneaks in again and moves the ring to another place, then exits. The subject is asked: a. According to the Princess, where will the Villain look for the ring when he comes back? b. According to the Villain, where will the Princess look for the ring when she comes back? Comment: the subject has to understand that both expect the other to look for the ring in the original hideout, although one of them, the Villain, holds a different belief about where the ring actually is.
[20] The Princess and the Villain. The subject is shown two puppets, the Princess and the Villain. The Villain is then put away. The subject is told that the Villain is chasing the Princess, and is requested to suggest a hideout to the Princess. The Princess is hidden in the place chosen by the subject. Then the Villain enters, and asks the subject where the Princess is. After the subject has replied, the Villain exits and the subject is asked to explain why he said whatever he said. Comment: in order to pass the task, the subject has to lie, pointing the Villain to a wrong place, while letting him believe it is the right one.
[21] Chocolates or biscuits? The subject is shown some chocolates and some biscuits, and asked which he likes better. Then, he is told that the Villain will also choose either, that he (the Villain) will choose first and that, being a Villain, he will always choose what the subject would choose. Then the Villain enters, and asks the subject "Which sweet do you like better?". Again, after the subject has replied, the Villain exits and the subject is asked to explain why he has said what he has. Comment: the task here is to lie to the Villain about the preferred sweet, so to have him choose the less preferred one. In the evaluation of the performance, the possibility of a double deceit must also be controlled: the subject may suppose that the Villain would pect a deceit, therefore choosing the sweet the subject had not indicated. In this case, paradoxically, the task is passed if the subject does not lie. No subject pushed the nesting beyond the second level.
Failures of deceits
We explored the failure of deceits with the following protocol:
[22] (Child A has a toy that Child B always asks for himself. There are two boxes in the living room, one red and one yellow. When Child A sees Child B coming, she hides the toy in the yellow box. Child B enters). Child B: "Could I have a box?". Child A: "Yes". Child B: "Which one can I have?". Child A points at the red box. Child B takes the yellow box and goes away.
We asked the subject what Child A might do after this. As in the other cases of failure, our prediction was of a poor performance: worse than that on the successful case, and worse than that on failures of the standard path and of irony. As we have discussed, deceits are among the most complex cognitive phenomena in communication.
Results
The results of the experimental group are reported in Tables 3 and 4 ; the control group solved the tasks without a single error. Here we find the first statistically significant difference with the control group, which is an unsurprising confirmation of our predictions, given the heavy load imposed by deceits on an agent's inferential and planning capabilities. Of the 13 subjects, errors were made by two in [19] , none in [20], six in [21] , and eight in [22] . Considering the successx utters: "There will be an attack to Verdun tomorrow." Let p = There will be an attack to Verdun tomorrow. Assume that BEL x ¬p, i.e., x is attempting to deceive y.
SH yx p
Successful deceit: y trusts x and assumes p to be shared.
BEL y ¬p BEL y SH xy p
Although y does not recognize the deceit, he does not believe p anyway (e.g., he thinks that x is mistaken).
BELy ¬p
BELy BEL x ¬p BEL y BEL x SH yx p
The deceit is detected, but y believes that x has not realized the failure of her attempt.
BEL y ¬p BEL y BEL x ¬p BEL y BEL x BEL y ¬p BEL y BEL x BEL y SH yx p
The deceit is detected, y realizes that x has recognized the failure, but thinks that x has not recognized that y has understood that x has recognized that the deceit was detected.
… SH yx ¬p It is shared that the deceit has been detected, e.g., becaus e y has denounced it. ful deceits taken as a whole (tasks [19] , [20], and [21] ), thus, there were 8 errors out of 13 3 = 39 items (21% of the total). The comparison with the control subjects is highly significant: Student's t = 2.889, p < .008**). As for the failure (task [22] ), there were 5 errors out of 13 1 = 13 items (38%); the comparison with the controls is highly significant: Student's t = 4.302, p < .0002**. Decomposition into subitems brings some interesting result as to the relative difficulty of the tasks. Given our theoretical analysis, task [22] was expected to be the hardest, because it requires the recognition of the failure and the planning of a suitable strategy for recovery; in this case, further, both involve a relatively complex nesting of mental states. Task [21] also involves a complex nesting, but should be easier than [22] , because to plan a deceit is simpler than to recognize and repair a failed one. We had no way to predict the relative difficulty of the two tasks remaining. Task [20] We explored these possibilities with Page's test (Page 1963 ). The latter is highly significant (L = 246, p < .01**), confirming our predictions and also showing that CHI subjects find it harder, ceteris paribus, to deal with the nesting of mental states than with the planning of simple lies. This trend also shows if only the three successful cases (i.e., 
Theory of mind inferences
As we have repeatedly discussed, understanding communication often requires reasoning upon another agent's supposed mental states. The skill to simulate another individual's mental states is peculiar to the human species and, possibly, to a few other anthropomorphic Primates such as chimpanzee (Premack & Woodruff 1978) . At least in our species, it seems to require a specialized, modular machinery dubbed Theory of Mind Mechanism, or ToMM (Leslie 1987 (Leslie , 1994 . A disorder in the development of ToMM is associated with childhood autism (BaronCohen 1995; Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith 1985; Leslie & Thaiss 1992) , while its later disruption might be associated with schizophrenia (Frith 1992 ).
An active ToMM is required whenever the complexity of the current interaction goes beyond what is in the individual's memory, i.e., always, the exceptions being highly conventional and script-like contexts (such as participating in a ceremony, or buying bread and milk), where nobody would seriously wonder about the speaker's mental states, unless something very peculiar happens.
There are currently a large number of experimental studies in this area. Most aim at understanding what species, beside humans, possess the ability to simulate conspecifics' mental states (e.g., Byrne & Whiten eds. 1988; Premack & Woodruff 1978; Whiten ed. 1991) , or at clarifying its development in the child (e.g., Astington, Harris & Olson eds. 1988; Perner 1991; Wellman 1990 ; see also Karmiloff-Smith 1992 for an overview).
Although we are more interested in communication here, rather than in ToMM per se, we wanted to assess our subjects' capability to perform basic ToMM tasks, because of their crucial role in conversation. Further, we are not aware of any data in the literature about ToMM performance in brain damaged persons. We expected no impairment of this ability, or at most a very mild one, because a dramatic damage to the ToMM would correspondingly hamper any social interaction but the simplest (Frith 1992) : simulating other individuals is necessary for any kind of high-level social behavior, whether communicative or not. The literature, on the other hand, is unanimous in evaluating the social life of these brain-damaged patients as substantially preserved.
We used two classical tasks of the area, known under the names of "Maxi task" (Wimmer & Perner 1983) and "Smarties task" (Perner, Leekam & Wimmer 1987 ):
[23] Maxi task. Two persons (the subject, and a foil conventionally named Maxi) watch while the experimenter puts a chocolate bar in a drawer. Maxi then leaves the room. The experimenter opens the drawer, takes out the chocolate and hides it elsewhere. The subject is then asked where Maxi will look for the chocolate when he comes back. Comment: the task is passed if the subject answers that Maxi will look into the drawer.
[24] Smarties task. The subject is shown a closed Smarties box and asked to guess what is inside. Obviously, he answers there are Smarties. Then the box is open and he can see there is a pencil instead. The box is closed again. Then the subject is asked to guess what Maxi will answer when asked the same question. Comment: since Maxi has not seen the pencil, the correct answer is "Smarties".
To pass these tasks, the subject has to realize the relationships between perception, belief, and action, and the autonomy of each individual's mental states. It is easy to see how closely the structure of these tasks resembles that of the other ones we devised. This similarity is intrinsic to our approach to communication, that strongly emphasizes the reciprocal simulation of the agents involved in conversation. Theory of mind Table 5 . Comparison between the performance on the successful and the failure case.
Results
The control group solved both tasks without any error. The results of the experimental group are reported in Table 3 . There was only one error on the Maxi task and none on the Smarties task. This confirms our expectations: possible problems in communication after CHI are not due to a diminished ability in reasoning on other individuals' mental states.
Global results
All our major predictions were confirmed. As a first thing, we found no evidence for the greater difficulty of indirect with respect to direct speech acts, that would be predicted by most studies in pragmatics and in neuropsychology. We have already discussed the topic and have presented some hypotheses as to why our data differ from those available in the relevant literature (see Section 5 ). An issue worth discussing here, before turning to a more detailed analysis of the data, is that of response time. We have not reported the time it took to the subjects to solve (or not to solve) the tasks. As Kosslyn & Intriligator (1992) point out, time is an important factor with tasks of this kind, in that a response time of, say, 5 min instead of 20 sec may indicate a severe impairment in the underlying cognitive processes, which would pass undetected if only the correctness of the answer is taken into account. Having tape-recorded all the protocols, we found that the time taken by the control and the experimental groups was comparable; actually, the total time for completing the protocol never varied more than 10 min on an average of 30 min.
Trends in difficulty
The theory predicts various differences in processing difficulty. Nonstandard paths, taken as a whole, are expected to be more difficult than the standard path. Within the standard path, further, simple speech acts (whether direct or indirect) are expected to be easier than complex ones. Among the nonstandard paths, the increase should be from irony to deceits to failures.
In analyzing these trends, we collapsed the data of direct and simple indirect speech acts. We put them together for two reasons. The first is theoretical: we assume them to be processed in the same way, and to be absolutely equivalent. The second reason is empirical: none of our 13 subjects made even a single error in understanding them.
In short, our predicted trend of difficulty is the following:
simple (direct and indirect) speech acts < complex speech acts << irony < deceits < failures This hypothesis is confirmed by the data: Page's test gives L = 462 (p < .01**).
It is important to remember that, for each pragmatic category, we chose relatively simple tasks. There can be little doubt that a complex irony (such as Voltaire's, quoted in Section 6) is harder to comprehend than a very simple deceit (such as a simple yes/no lie: "Was it you who ate the jam?", "No"). Our data prove that a simple irony is easier than a simple deceit, but harder than a simple standard path, and so on. We would never derive from this trend that any irony is easier than any deceit, and harder than any standard path.
Had we used more difficult tasks, we might have found more differences between the experimental and the control groups. As we have already discussed in Section 5, however, our aim was not to prove that communication is necessarily damaged after CHI. Instead, we wanted to start our investigation from the very fundamentals of communication, such as can be found in everyday, colloquial communication. We found that communication is actually impaired after CHI, although in quite a subtle way. We believe that this result was due to the adoption of a clear and detailed theory of communication, which provided us with a set of formal definitions and allowed us to clearly define the scope of our analyses and to formulate precise predictions, although of a qualitative nature.
There would have been little point in the exploration of more complex aspects of the theory, without a prior understanding of the extent to which our subjects could handle basic ones. Once departed from basic tasks, further, it becomes more difficult to decide what is more or less simple, and why. An ironic utterance, for example, may be difficult to understand because it requires a complex inferential chain, or because it requires a heavy use of some unusual world knowledge.
Failures
Failures are a complex topic, from both a theoretical and a neuropsychological point of view. Let us review our predictions and results.
The impairment in the subjects' performance on failures taken as a whole, compared to the control group, is highly significant (Student's t = 3.888, p < .0007**; see Table 3 ). Decomposing this result into subitems (Table 4) , all the performances prove significantly worse than those of the control group: on direct and indirect speech acts (in both cases t = 2.739, p < .01**), on irony (t = 2.739, p < .01**) and, with a high significance, on deceits (t = 4.382, p < .0002**).
A second prediction was that, within each pragmatic category (direct speech acts, indirect speech acts, irony and deceits), the performance had to be worse on the examples of failure than on the successful ones: to repair a failure requires that the actor recognize it, identify its causes and plan a suitable alternative strategy. For each category, we used Wilcoxon's test to compare the performance on the failure to that on the average of the three examples of success. As can be seen from Table 5 , the prediction is generally confirmed (except in the case of irony, which is, however, near significant).
Finally, we expected failures to show a trend similar to that of the successful cases, i.e., we expected failures of deceits to be harder than failures of irony, and failures of irony harder than failures of the standard path. Page's test disconfirms this hypothesis by a very slight interval (L = 159 against a minimum of 163 for a p < .05 significance). Remarkably, however, there is no difference between the failures of direct and of indirect speech acts, which adds further evidence to our hypothesis on the topic.
Other neuropsychological correlations
We had no particular predictions about the possible correlations between the subjects' performance on the tasks about communication and on collateral neuropsychological tests. Although we did not perform a statistical evaluation of this topic, some observations may be of interest.
Four subjects made no errors at all: 9, 10, 11, and 13. Three of these performed relatively well on collateral tests. Subject 11 presents a more severe cognitive impairment; this apparent contradiction might be due to her rehabilitation program, part of which is currently concentrating on planning.
Subject 5 only made mistakes on deceits. Globally, her cognitive damage is mild, but her memory is more severely impaired, in both its short-and long-term components.
Two subjects, 1 and 8, only had trouble with failure recovery. Both present frontal symptoms and a damage to the working memory. In general, working memory seems to be the function most sensitively related to the communicative performance.
The remaining six subjects made errors in two or three categories each. Here we find those with the oldest onset of pathology: 2, 4 and 6 (respectively, 65, 145 and 63 months). These three subjects are logorrheic, possibly as an attempt to compensate for their communicative deficit, but often get tangled up in their own talk, and leave the partner the responsibility to find a way out. However, they would typically deny having any problem whatsoever, and always try to impress favorably upon the partner. Subject 2 is, within this group, the less impaired from a general point of view; he was able to solve closed judgment task on complex indirect speech acts and on deceits, but not on failure recovery. The last three subjects (3, 7 and 12) are the most severely impaired from a cognitive viewpoint.
Clearly, these observations might be strengthened, and lend themselves to statistical analysis, with a greater number of subjects. As a first comment, we find them reasonable: working memory is likely to be heavily involved in the kind of reasoning required for the handling of deceit, where complex nestings of mental states have to be taken into account, i.e., it is likely to play a major role in complex ToMM reasoning. As regards planning, it is crucial to failure re-covery: not surprisingly, it is impaired in the subjects who find these tasks particularly puzzling.
Future work
As we have already stated, this work did not aim at building a cognitive theory from neuropsychological data. Our goal was rather to test some predictions drawn from an independently developed theory of communicative competence, to constrain it with data from impaired performance, and to match it against competing ones.
We are quite satisfied with the data collected. When a competing theory exists, as in the case of the direct/indirect controversy, our data validate our thesis. Further, our theory predicts the trend of difficulty exhibited by CHI subjects in the experiments. No existing theory of pragmatics had proposed such a precise and justified trend before.
The work presented here is meant as an initial step. Planned developments include a followup of these subjects after their recovery, and a broadening of the analysis to cover other pathologies (e.g., Alzheimer's disease and other forms of dementia, Parkinson's disease, etc.), as well as to subjects with no neuropsychological involvement (e.g., elderly persons). We also plan to study focal lesions; in particular, to investigate possible differences between pathologies of the right and of the left hemisphere. A good idea would be, of course, to use tests like those proposed here as a first screening, to identify the most interesting subjects and to focus on them with greater attention. This will require tests for the effective exploration of less fundamental aspects of communication. Finally, we are developing an approach to discourse planning; this is particularly interesting from a neuropsychological point of view, since many pathologies seem to affect the generation of behavior of one's own rather than the comprehension of the behavior of other individuals'.
